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Associated Gas (AG) flaring in Nigeria is a topical issue in view of the international 
efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions thereby saving the global environment. The 
Nigerian government has attempted to eliminate or at least, reduce the volumes of the 
AG that is currently being flared through both regulatory and non-regulatory measures. 
However, this attempt reveals deficiency in the legal and regulatory frameworks set to 
combat the flaring, the lack of efficient and effective regulatory procedures, coupled 
with the seeming lack of political will from the government to do so. While 
acknowledging the menace of AG flaring to environment, the current Nigerian 
President while declaring open the 6th African Petroleum conference and exhibition 
held on 15th - 17th March 2016 (CAPE VI) affirmed that, gas flaring in Nigeria 
amounts to about 23 billion cubic metre per annum in over 100 flares sites and thus, 
constitute over 13 per cent of global gas flaring. He therefore stressed that, in 
processing Africa's hydrocarbon resources, environmental issues must be accorded 
huge priority. Even though, Nigeria has recently made significant effort to combat AG 
flaring in 2011 when it introduced and presented Petroleum Industry Bill to the 
National Assembly for the reform and overhaul of the petroleum industry, however, the 
Bill is still with Assemblies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gas is being flared because oil and natural gas are mixed in every oil deposit, the 
natural gas called "associated gas (AG)" must be separated from the oil deposit before 
refining, and thus, the act of flaring simply mean, the burning of the AG that cannot be 
utili ed2. Therefore, the AG flaring relea e a gaseou substance into atmo phere 
knows as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and thus affects climate system and 
pollutes environment. There are various international instruments aimed at 
afeguarding environment from adver e effects resulting from petroleum activities and 
this began with the Stockholm Conference3 in 1972 and the publication of the 
1 Is a holder of LLM in Oil and Gas Law from the Robert Gordon University - UK and a Lecturer at the Department
of Civil Law and Shari'ah Yohe Stare University, Damaluru. 
2 Brown E.U, 'Gas Plaring, Environmental Corporate Responsibility and the Right to a Healthy Environment: The
case of Niger Delta' in Festus Emiri and Gowon Deinduomo, Law and Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (Malthouse 
Press Limited 2009) ch. 4 p 49 
3 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972, Principle 21
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Brundtland Commission report in 1987 tagged 'Our Common Future'4. The report, 
among other things called for the sustainable development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs '5• Thi followed with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to evaluate the yet not exhaustive debate on whether 
the concentration of GHG emissions and other atmospheric pollutions are changing the 
climate system or not, if so, what are its impact on the planet, adaptation and 
mitigation. The IPCC report led to the signing and adoption by the member countries of 
the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change6 and its Protocol was 
adopted in 1997 7.
Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing nation and the second largest gas-flaring 
nation in the world after Russia. Available data shows that oil and gas companies 
operating in Nigeria burn over $3.5 to $5 billion yearly from the over 257 flow stations 
in the Niger Delta. In 2014 to be specific, the country lost $868.8 million about Nl 74 
billion to gas flaring according to available data from NNPC. It is estimated that about 
20 - 40% of its AG production was flared in 2015, thereby contributing almost 13% of 
the total global gas flared in 20158• The unabated continued AG flaring in Nigeria has 
significant adverse environmental, socio-economic and health effects on the local 
communities particularly the oil producing communities9• Pro environmentalists 
de cribe the ituation as an evil act10 and thus, its impacts have become a strong 
rallying point for environmental campaign against the activities of oil companies in the 
country. 
Successive Nigerian Governments have adopted the strict hard-line stance of 
prohibiting flaring by means of legislation while imposing penalties, fines and 
environmental taxation as a means of discouraging the practice. Fiscal incentives were 
also established to encourage investment in gas utilisation 11. However, the absence of 
effective and efficient legal and regulatory mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance of the law and policies had led to sub-optimal outcomes in the Nigeria's 
4 "The report is the crystallisation of clot of ideas, thoughts and philosophies, concepts designs that signalled the
urgency of formulating a system of sustainable development which did not deplete natural resources or harm the 
environment". 
5 United Nation, 'Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development - Our Common Future'
(Bnmdtland Report) 1987, part 1 ch 2 
6 Adopted al the Rio de Jeneiro L992
7 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 1997 entered into force 16 February 2005 
8 President Muhammadu Buhari at lhe 6TH African Petroleum and Exhibition (CAPE VI) held on the 15 - 17 March
2016. Available at: http://cape-africa.com/presentations/ Accessed on the 3rd June, 2016. 
9 Elisha J.D , Leonard S.B, and Tano D.A, 'The Effect of Gas Flaring on Crops in the Niger Delta, Nigeria' (2008)
73 Geo Journal 297-305 
10 Climate Justice Programme/Environmental Rights Association, 'Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, 
Environmental and Economic Monstrosity' (2008) available at: < 
<http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/cases/case-documents/nigeria/e:as-flaring-in-nigeria.pdf.> 
accessed on 12 June 2014 
11 Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provision) Decree 1998 and The Associated Gas Framework Agreement 1998 
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effort to combat AG flaring. Therefore, this article firstly examined the major reasons 
why oil companies continue to flare gas unabated, the article critically evaluated the 
Nigeria's anti-gas flaring frameworks and the key hindrances to the government's 
efforts to end the AG flaring in the country. Lastly, recommendations are made toward 
combating thereby improving the utilisation of AG flaring. 
Major Reasons for Continues Gas Flaring around the Globe
Generally, the reason why oil companies flares gas to the atmosphere is p
rimarily for
safety reasons12 or due to lack of infrastructure that will evacuate it 
to market or
processing plants. Flaring wastes a valuable clean energy re ource and em
its carbon
dioxide - a GHG emission. It wastes a valuable and comparatively low-ca
rbon energy
ource and results in emissions of about 350 million tons of CO2 a year
13 • However,
there are hard and soft major causes of AG flaring around the world. The 
hard causes
include; distance from significant gas markets or adequate transportatio
n facilities,
reliability of gas supply, gas refining infrastructure and funding constraint
s and risks
associated with the re-injection of gas in to the oil reservoir. While the 
soft causes
among others include; unproductive and inefficient institutional, legal and
 regulatory
framework for combating AG flaring, ineffective fiscal terms, immatur
e domestic
market for gas product and lack of coordinated actions by multiple stakehold
ers 14. 
Frameworks for Combating AG Flaring In Nigeria
The Nigerian authorities have put in place legislative, regulatory and i
nstitutional
measures aimed at combating AG flaring since the inception of 
production,
Examination of major frameworks are: 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The Nigerian authorities have passed various laws regulating the mana
gement of
petroleum activities and safeguarding the environment . Examination of
 Nigerian
legislation reveals many laws regulating the practice of flaring AG amo
ng these
includes: 
12 International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), 'Flaring and Venting
 in the Oil & Gas Exploration &
Production Industry - An Overview of Purpose, Quantities, Issues, Practices an
d Trends' Report No. 2 79/288 of
January2000 
13 Mathew F, Jenna G, Sarah L, and Kate Z, 'Crossing the Natural Gas Brid
ge' (2009) Centre for Strategic &
International Studies 
14 The World Bank, 'World Bank, GGFR Partners Unlock Value of Waste
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The Petroleum Act 196915 
This i
_
s the primary ba�is_ 
for laws and policies regulating AG flaring in Nigeria. The
Act gives petr�leu� mm1ster power to make regulations relating to licences and other 
�atters !� which issues relating to prevention of pollution to the atmosphere are 
mcluded and the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation17 was made 
pu�s�ant to the �o�er. The Regulation required the oil companies to submit to the 
Mm1ster any_ feas1b1hty study, programme or proposals for the utilisation of the AG thathas been discovered in their licensed area not later than five years after the 
co�ence�ent of the produc�i?n
1
�. Although, the Regulation requires oil companies to
sub_rrut their plans f?r AG ut1hsahon, however, the provision was not seen as legallyobhgatory and contamed no penalty for non-compliance19. 
More?v�r, there were also no measures to discourage flaring before or after the 
subrruss1on of the re�uired feasibility study or programme for gas utilisation. 
Apparently, the Regulat1o�s. m�rely required oil companies to submit a feasibility study or programme_ for gas u_tihsah_on and nothing more. Consequently, an oil companycould engage m AG fl�_mg_ pnor _
or after submitting the required feasibility study or
progr�e for �as ut�hsat10n without any penalty. Similarly, the wording of the
�egulat10n that, the Licensee or lessee of an Oil Mining License shall not later than
five years after th� �o:'1menceme�t of production, submit to the Minister of Petroleum
Resourc_es, a feaszbzhty study... can be seen as an express permission of the oilcompanies to flares AG for a period of five years without any scrutiny2°. 
T?erefore, �he Regulation was '"'not fit for purpose" as it was neither adhered to by the 
?11 compames nor enforced by the Nigerian government
21
. In any event, the Act was 
mherently fla�ed as reg�rd AG flaring and therefore, could be suggested that, from the 
start of_ the 011 exploration until 1979, there was practically no legal framework forcombatmg gas flaring in Nigeria. 
Th_e �ssocia�ed �as -�einjection Act
22 and the Regulation23
T�1s �s th� first s1�mf1cant legal framework specifically for combating AG flaring in 
N1gena laid down m 1979. The Act required the oil companies to prepare and submit to 
15 Cap 350 L.F.N 1990 
16 Ibid s 9 (1) (b) & 12 
:: T�e Regula�on is made pursuant to Section 9 of the Petroleum Act, Deere� No. 51 of 1969 
Ibid Regulanon 42 
19 Orji U.J, 'An appraisal of the legal frameworks for the control of environmental pollution in Nigeria' (2012) 38 
(2) Commonweahh law Bulletin p. 331
:� Adeniji G, 'Approaches to Ga Flare Reduction in Nigeria' (2012) Global Forum for Gas Flare Reduction
Garba I.M,. ':hase-Oul of Ga Flaring in Nigeria by 2008: The Prospects of a Multi-Win Project' (2007)
�etroleum Trammg Joumal (PTJ) Vol. 1 (4) No. 2 .1-40 
Decree No. 99 of 1979, Cap 26 LFN 1990 (now Cap. A 25 LPN 2004) 
23 The Associated Gas Re-injection (Co111i1111ed Flai·ing of Gas) Regulation 1984, Supplement to Official Gazette No. 
67 Vol. 71 of 29 November 1984 (SI 43 of 1984, Cap A 25 LFN 2004) 
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the minister programme for AG utilisation or re-injection24 and expressly prohibited
AG flaring after 1 st January 1984 unless in exceptional case 25 with a forfeiture of the
conces ion/licence as a likely penalty for contravening the provision26• These goals 
proved to be unrealistic for reasons that include; the huge financial resources required 
for gas re-injection facilities, inability of the Nigerian government to meet its financial 
obligations under the various joint venture agreements and the insistence by the oil and. 
gas companies of their inability to meet the deadline27 .
Therefore, where it became apparent to the government that, the oil companies were 
not able and ready to meet the deadline, the prohibition was relaxed. The Petroleum 
Minister in the exercise of his power under the Act28 established the Associated Gas
Re-injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulation 198429 • The Regulation allowed oil 
companies to continue flaring of AG under permits is ued by the minister30, but ubject
to payment of a penalty of two kobo (N0.02k) per 1000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas 
flared at any place where the permission to flare was not granted31 .
However, it was observed that, the exemptions under the Regulations had the 
immediate effect of exempting a total of 86 out of 155 oil fields from anti-flaring 
provisions32, while, the remaining fields were subject to a fairly insignificant penalty
that made it far more economical for the companies to flare the AG than to utilize or re­
inject it33. For instance, an oil company was quoted to have said that, "it was cheaper to
flare gas, while gas flaring would cost the company only $1 million, the cost of 
swjtching from water to gas injection would cost $56 million"34• Therefore, following 
campaigns and pres ure from environmental campaign groups35 the Regulation wa
amended and the fine was increased to fifty Koba (N0.50k) in 199036 and was further 
increased to ten naira (Nl0.00) in 1998 for every 1000 scf flared37• In 2009 also, the 
government established the National Domestic Gas Pricing and Supply regulations,
which also increased AG flaring fines to $3.50 USD for every 1000 cf of gas flared38 .
24 Ibid s 2 
25 Ibid s 3 
26 Ibid s 4 (1) 
27 Yinka 0, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria: Simplified ( l  ST Edition Malthouse Press, Nigeria 2003) 59 
28 s 3&4 op. Cit (n 22)29 Op. Cit (n 23) 
30 Ibid 
31 The Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act 1985 Decree No. 7 of 1985 
32 Yinka 0, op. Cit (n 27) 
33 Ibid 
34 Yinka 0, 'An appraisal of Nigerian natural gas legislation' (1985) 4 (2) Oil and Gas Law Ta.ration Review, 51 
35 The Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Gas Flaring: Assaulting Co1111111111ities, Jeopardizing the World
(Environmental Rights Action: Nigeria, 10-11 December 2008), p. 6 
36 The Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Regulations, 1990
37 The Petroleum Drilling and Ptod11ctio11 (Amendment) Regulati.on 1998 
38 Uche�na J.O_, •�oving from Gas Flaring to Gas Conservation and Utilisation In Nigeria: A Review of the Legaland Policy Regime (2014) OPEC Energy Review 149 - 183 
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However, oil companies prefer to pay the meager penalty that is comparatively cheaper 
than utilising the AG. 
Therefore, these sanctions appear not to have achieved its aim of discouraging the 
practice of AG flaring as the fines were too meager to serve as a deterrent or 
punishment. In fact, the fines monetised AG flaring at a very cheap rate, and made it 
more economical for oil companies to flare AG rather than its utilisation or re-injection. 
Thus, despite the fact that the government adopted an economic approach to encourage 
AG flaring reduction, the approach failed to achieve the desired objectives. Hence, oil 
companies find it more economical and advantageous to flare AG than utilise or re­
inject it. This state of affairs has continued to the present day as all efforts to end gas 
flaring has been without success39•
The Petroleum Industry Bill, 201246 
This proposed Bill has been another significant legislative effort by the Nigerian 
authorities to combat the menace of AG flaring and promote its utilisation. The bill 
seeks to consolidate all the existing oil and gas laws in the country into one piece of 
legislation in accordance with the principle of good governance, tran parency and the 
sustainable development of Nigeria4 1 .The key a pect of the Bill touching on AG flaring 
ha been the Chapter D42 that addressed a wide range of issues. The Bill prohibits AG 
flaring, but provides certain exceptional situations that permit can be granted43 . For 
instance, for afety rea on, in cases of ta.rt-up, equipment failure shut down, or due to 
the inability of the gas customer to take-off delivery44• The bill provides that, the oil 
companies must stop flaring of AG after the flare-out date, which is to be prescribed by 
the Minister in Regulations to be made pursuant to the Act45• It declared that, any 
company that flares or vents AG without a permit from the Minister shall liable to pay 
a fine, which shall not be less than the value of the gas flared46• It also makes AG
flaring without a permit a criminal offence47• 
In particular, the Bill imposes the requirement of a gas utilisation plan as a condition 
precedent for grant of an oil production lease or license in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. It provides that; "a license or lease for the production of oil and gas in
Nigeria shall not be granted to a company unless the application is accompanied by a 
comprehensive gas utilisation or re-injection programme which is acceptable to the 
39 Ibid 
:0 The Bill was presented to the both Chambers of the National Assembly by the Nigerian President in July 19, 2012
1 The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012, s 8 - 9 
42 Ibid chapter on Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment), Sections 251-259
43 Ibid s 251 
44 Ibid s 253 (1) (b) 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid s 277(3)
47 Ibid s 281 
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24 Ibid s 2 
25 Ibid s 3 
26 Ibid s 4 (1) 
27 Yinka 0, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria: Simplified ( l  ST Edition Malthouse Press, Nigeria 2003) 59 
28 s 3&4 op. Cit (n 22)29 Op. Cit (n 23) 
30 Ibid 
31 The Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act 1985 Decree No. 7 of 1985 
32 Yinka 0, op. Cit (n 27) 
33 Ibid 
34 Yinka 0, 'An appraisal of Nigerian natural gas legislation' (1985) 4 (2) Oil and Gas Law Ta.ration Review, 51 
35 The Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Gas Flaring: Assaulting Co1111111111ities, Jeopardizing the World
(Environmental Rights Action: Nigeria, 10-11 December 2008), p. 6 
36 The Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Regulations, 1990
37 The Petroleum Drilling and Ptod11ctio11 (Amendment) Regulati.on 1998 
38 Uche�na J.O_, •�oving from Gas Flaring to Gas Conservation and Utilisation In Nigeria: A Review of the Legaland Policy Regime (2014) OPEC Energy Review 149 - 183 
98 
Unimaid Journal of Public Law Vol. 4, July, 2016. 
However, oil companies prefer to pay the meager penalty that is comparatively cheaper 
than utilising the AG. 
Therefore, these sanctions appear not to have achieved its aim of discouraging the 
practice of AG flaring as the fines were too meager to serve as a deterrent or 
punishment. In fact, the fines monetised AG flaring at a very cheap rate, and made it 
more economical for oil companies to flare AG rather than its utilisation or re-injection. 
Thus, despite the fact that the government adopted an economic approach to encourage 
AG flaring reduction, the approach failed to achieve the desired objectives. Hence, oil 
companies find it more economical and advantageous to flare AG than utilise or re­
inject it. This state of affairs has continued to the present day as all efforts to end gas 
flaring has been without success39•
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ha been the Chapter D42 that addressed a wide range of issues. The Bill prohibits AG 
flaring, but provides certain exceptional situations that permit can be granted43 . For 
instance, for afety rea on, in cases of ta.rt-up, equipment failure shut down, or due to 
the inability of the gas customer to take-off delivery44• The bill provides that, the oil 
companies must stop flaring of AG after the flare-out date, which is to be prescribed by 
the Minister in Regulations to be made pursuant to the Act45• It declared that, any 
company that flares or vents AG without a permit from the Minister shall liable to pay 
a fine, which shall not be less than the value of the gas flared46• It also makes AG
flaring without a permit a criminal offence47• 
In particular, the Bill imposes the requirement of a gas utilisation plan as a condition 
precedent for grant of an oil production lease or license in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. It provides that; "a license or lease for the production of oil and gas in
Nigeria shall not be granted to a company unless the application is accompanied by a 
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39 Ibid 
:0 The Bill was presented to the both Chambers of the National Assembly by the Nigerian President in July 19, 2012
1 The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012, s 8 - 9 
42 Ibid chapter on Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment), Sections 251-259
43 Ibid s 251 
44 Ibid s 253 (1) (b) 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid s 277(3)
47 Ibid s 281 
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M. . ,,4s I 1 mister . t a so mandates all operators to mstall metering equipment within three 
months of the Act coming into force to measure the volume of gas flared49. However, 
all these legislative efforts shown were in vein, as the bill is still with the National 
Assemblies without any certainty as to its passage into law and that the date line of 31 
December 2012 set by the previous administration of Goodluck Jonathan for stopping 
AG flaring has already been passed and the PIB has not yet adopted. 
Additionally, everal other Bill were propo ed between 2009/2010 for the prohibition 
o� the flaring, which set up deadlines of 31 December 201250. Among the proposed
B1lls_are, �e Ga� Flaring_ (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2010
51
, which provides 
for higher fmancial penalties and the possibility of shutting down oil fields that default. 
While, the Environmental Management Bill 2010 even went ahead to hold oil 
companies and the Directors criminally liable for not ending the AG flaring after the 
stated deadline and set a minimum of 10 years imprisonment or fine of N500 million 
Naira on conviction. However, these Bills were certainly not passed into law up till 
now, while the federal executive's preference for a longer deadline have scuttle efforts 
at progres ive legislative changes52 . 
Fiscal Framework 
Realising its objective to combat AG flaring through legal measures alone could not be 
achievable, the Nigerian government had in 1990 resorted to incentive based fiscal 
framework that will enhance investment in AG utilisation. The Nigerian government 
enacted three major Acts to support its efforts and these include; the Nigerian Liquefied
Natural Gas (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act, the Associated Gas
Framework Agreement (AGPA) and West African Gas Pipeline Project (Ratification
and Enforcement) Act. 
Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (Fiscal Incentive Guarantee & Assurances) Act53
The aim of this Act is to provide incentives, guarantees and assurances for investments 
and projects relating to the exploitation and utilisation of natural gas in Nigeria54. It 
also aimed to convince the foreign shareholders that their investments in the 
development of liquefied natural gas plants would be well secured from the 
48 Ibid s 278 
49 Ibid s279 
50 Among the Bills also includes Natural Gas Bill 2009 
51 Passed by the Nigerian Senate in July 2009 
52 Mark O and Tonye N, Overcoming Nigeria's Energy Crises - Towards Effective Utilisation of Associated Gas
and Renewable Resources in the Niger Delta' (2009) Social Action Briefing No. 2 53 Decree No. 39 of .1990, SupplemenL to Official GazeneExLraordinary No.76 of30 December 1990 Part A pp 
A591-598 
' . . 
54 EIA, Country Analysis Briefs-Nigeria (16 October 2012), p. 15
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government's interference55. It also assured that, the legal regime and the government's 
fiscal guarantees would not be subject to unilateral amendments or to changing political. d s6 wm s . 
The Associated Gas Framework Agreement (AGFA)
57 
The Nigerian government in consultation with international oil companies introduced 
AGFA to encourage and facilitate the development of the LNG, which in turn will 
reduce AG flaring. The framework provides tax holiday incentives and an exemption 
for all AG utilisation projects as part of the eligible oil field development58. The impact 
of this incentive was shortly realised as the Nigerian LNG Project was accompli hed59
to which Nigeria made its first export of natural gas to Europe in 199960•
Furthermore, the framework provided additional incentives for investment in AG 
utilisation projects and thus, Gas projects attract 30% tax rate as opposed to 85% of oil 
projects, capital expenditures for gas projects are chargeable under the Companies 
income Tax Act instead of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act. It further introduced 3-5 year 
tax holiday for any development relating to AG utilisation, exemption on custom duties 
and VAT on ga related development equipment, 15% investment capital allowance, 
interest deductible on loao.s and Dividends during tax holiday are tax-free61. Thus, it 
was within this framework some major gas projects such as Oso condensate project; 
Escravos ga �roject, LNG project and West African gas pipeline project (y.1 AGPP)
were initiated 2• However, the framework ha met with a setback largely due to the 
absence of infrastructure to harness and transport AG from most oil fields in the Niger 
Delta to the utilisation plants63. Furthermore, the fact that, an AG flaring option 
remained an easy and cheaper option due to the remoteness of the operation sites that 
made it difficult to transport could also be another reason for the continues practice of 
the AG flaring. 
55 Emole C.E, 'Nigeria's LNG fiscal incentives, investment-protection schemes and ICSID arbitration' (1996) 8 
A[rican Journal of International and Comparative Law 169
5 Yinka Omorogbe, 'Law and investor protection in the Nigerian natural gas industry' (1996) 14 (2) Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law 179
57 The Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provision) Decree 1998 
58 The exemption provided include duty and VAT free importation of machinery and equipment, tax holidays for 
seven years, etc. This was the first attempt by the Nigerian Government to provide non-regulatory measures to 
encourage gas utilization. 
59 The establishment of the project commenced in 1995 in a JV between the government of Nigeria, Shell, Total 
Agip and Mobil. 
60 Olusoga 0, 'Effects of Gas Pollution on the Environment' (2003) 4 OGEL, as of today, this project led to the
exports LNG to the following European buyers: ENEL (Italy), ENAGAS (Spain), Bolas (Turkey), Gazde France 
(France) and Transgas (Portugal). 
61 The Petroleum Profit Tax Act, Cap 354 LFN 1990 and cap P l 4  LFN 2010, S 10 -11 
62 Adaralegbe B, 'Stabilizing fiscal regimes in long-term contracts: recent developments from Nigeria' (2008) 1 (3) 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business 239-246
63 Uchenna J.O, 'Moving from Gas Flaring to Gas Conservation and Utilisation In Nigeria: A Review of the Legal 
and Policy Regime' (2014) OPEC Energy Review of June 2014 149 - 183
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for all AG utilisation projects as part of the eligible oil field development58. The impact 
of this incentive was shortly realised as the Nigerian LNG Project was accompli hed59
to which Nigeria made its first export of natural gas to Europe in 199960•
Furthermore, the framework provided additional incentives for investment in AG 
utilisation projects and thus, Gas projects attract 30% tax rate as opposed to 85% of oil 
projects, capital expenditures for gas projects are chargeable under the Companies 
income Tax Act instead of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act. It further introduced 3-5 year 
tax holiday for any development relating to AG utilisation, exemption on custom duties 
and VAT on ga related development equipment, 15% investment capital allowance, 
interest deductible on loao.s and Dividends during tax holiday are tax-free61. Thus, it 
was within this framework some major gas projects such as Oso condensate project; 
Escravos ga �roject, LNG project and West African gas pipeline project (y.1 AGPP)
were initiated 2• However, the framework ha met with a setback largely due to the 
absence of infrastructure to harness and transport AG from most oil fields in the Niger 
Delta to the utilisation plants63. Furthermore, the fact that, an AG flaring option 
remained an easy and cheaper option due to the remoteness of the operation sites that 
made it difficult to transport could also be another reason for the continues practice of 
the AG flaring. 
55 Emole C.E, 'Nigeria's LNG fiscal incentives, investment-protection schemes and ICSID arbitration' (1996) 8 
A[rican Journal of International and Comparative Law 169
5 Yinka Omorogbe, 'Law and investor protection in the Nigerian natural gas industry' (1996) 14 (2) Journal of 
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58 The exemption provided include duty and VAT free importation of machinery and equipment, tax holidays for 
seven years, etc. This was the first attempt by the Nigerian Government to provide non-regulatory measures to 
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Agip and Mobil. 
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West African Gas Pipeline Project Act (WAGPP Act)64
The basis of this Act was a treaty entered into by the Nigerian government and some
African countries on January 31, 2003 and was domesticated into national law by the
Nigerian National Assembly as the WAGPP Act. The treaty established the WAGPP
Authority - an international institution with legal personality, financial autonomy and
powers to implement pipeline project for transporting gas on behalf of member states65.
However, civil society groups have criticised the pro�osed W AGPP becau e of theinability of the project sponsors led by ChevronTexaco 6 to addres the problem of gas
flaring from their currently owned fields. Though the transnational corporation claims
that the project will contribute to flare reduction, hence, there remains no clear
programme for the use of flared AG into the W AGPP.
Institutional Framework 
The Nigerian government has established several overlapping institutions to regulate
the practice of AG flaring and these institutions are responsible for monitoring and
enforcement of laws and regulations relating to the AG flaring. Thus, there are
currently three major agencies charged with this responsibility of overseeing, among
other things the AG flaring and these are:
The Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) 
The MPR is the main executive body of the federal government charged with the
responsibility of regulating and implementation of policie · relating to petroleum and
other mineral resources and headed by a Minister67• The MPR also maintains standard
monitor quality and quantity, and regulate practices in the industry through its various
departments and parastatals. The Minister is responsible for coordinating the affairs of
the MPR and issuing the necessary regulations and permits for AG flaring under the
Petroleum Act68 . 
The Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) 
The FME was established in 1988 and was formerly called FEPA69 . The Ministry is
saddled with the responsibility of protecting and improving the quality of water, air,
64 LFN 2004 
65 Ibid s 2-5 
66 The WAGPP sponsors include: Chevron Nigeria Limited (36.7%), NNPC (25%), SPDC (18%), Volta River 
Authority of Ghana (16.3%), Societe Beninoise de Gaz S.A. (2%) and SocieLe Togolaise de Gaz S.A. (2%) and 
2ferated by as the Wesl African Gas Pipeline Company
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), "Mandate", available website: < http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-
11-06-51/execuLive-branch/ I 04-federal-mini try-of-petroleum-resources/184-ministry-of-peLroleum
resources?showalJ=l&ILmitstart=.> accessed on 16/09/2014 
68 The Petroleum Act, s 1 & 3 
69 The Federal Protection Agency Act 1988, s 1, it was later renamed FMENV by the office of the Secretary to the 
Government of Federation through, Presidency circular: Ref No. SGP/6/S.22/1 dated 121h October, 1999 
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land forest and wildlife in Nigeria70• Among other things, it prepares, co-ordinate,
pres�ribe and implement standards and regulations . for water �uality, e�fluentlimitation , air quality, atmo pheric and ozone protection, and morutor and enforce
environmental laws and regulation 71. The ministry consists of two Departments that
have an impact on the activities of AG flaring and these are; National Environmental
Standard and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) and the Department of
Environmental Assessment (DEA).
The DEA is charo-ed with implementing the provisions of the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIAr Act,72 which require the developer of major development projects
to conduct an environmental impact assessment before commencing work. While
NESREA73 is empowered to enforce all environmental laws, guidelines, policies,
standards, and regulations (including issues related to GHG emissions) in Nigeria, as
well as enforcing compliance with all international treaties, conventions, protocols and
agreements on the environment to which Nigeria is a party.
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
. . .. This is a department under the MPR an� was e�!ablished to supervise �he activities_ ofoil companies that are granted leases or licenses . It ensures that operations are earned
out in compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. The DPR also en�orces
safety and environmental regulations and advise �overnment an� �elev�nt agencies ontechnical matters and policies that would have an impact on admmistration and control
of the petroleum resources. It also monitors the oil companies' operations_ to ensurethey are in line with national goals and aspirations, including those relatmg to AG
flaring and domestic gas supply obligations.
In effect, petroleum operation as it relates to AG flaring are subject to the above �ets of
regulatory institutions, with no clear precedence of one over the oth�r. !his hasoccasioned a jurisdictional conflict between the main regulators of AG flanng 1.e. FM_E
and the DPR. Even though this conflict has been addressed, the DPR now operates m
conjunction with FME con equent of which FME has played an active role in the
review of the draft Environmental Guidelines for the Petroleum Indust1/5. Moreover,
both agencies currently have equal right to carry o�t inspecti�ns_ of the expl�ration and
production activities where reasonable grounds exist for believmg that envuonmental
70 The Nigeria Ministry of Environment, •gth National Council on Environment Report' Held at the Umar Musa
Yar'adua Indoor Sports Hall. Kaduna on Monday 26t
h to Friday �Olh September 2011 
71 Ibid see also FMENV website:< http://environment.gov.ng/?v1ew=featured.> accessed on the 18/08/2014 
72 Act No. 86 of 1992.
73 NESREA Act published in FRN Official Gazette No. 92, Vol. 94 of July 31, 2007.
74 The Petroleum Act 1969 LFN 1990, Schedule 1 
75 Garba I.M op. Cit (n 21) 
103
Examination of the Frameworks for Combating Gas Flaring in Nigeria - Why has the Nigerian Government failed 
to combat Gas Flaring 
West African Gas Pipeline Project Act (WAGPP Act)64
The basis of this Act was a treaty entered into by the Nigerian government and some
African countries on January 31, 2003 and was domesticated into national law by the
Nigerian National Assembly as the WAGPP Act. The treaty established the WAGPP
Authority - an international institution with legal personality, financial autonomy and
powers to implement pipeline project for transporting gas on behalf of member states65.
However, civil society groups have criticised the pro�osed W AGPP becau e of theinability of the project sponsors led by ChevronTexaco 6 to addres the problem of gas
flaring from their currently owned fields. Though the transnational corporation claims
that the project will contribute to flare reduction, hence, there remains no clear
programme for the use of flared AG into the W AGPP.
Institutional Framework 
The Nigerian government has established several overlapping institutions to regulate
the practice of AG flaring and these institutions are responsible for monitoring and
enforcement of laws and regulations relating to the AG flaring. Thus, there are
currently three major agencies charged with this responsibility of overseeing, among
other things the AG flaring and these are:
The Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) 
The MPR is the main executive body of the federal government charged with the
responsibility of regulating and implementation of policie · relating to petroleum and
other mineral resources and headed by a Minister67• The MPR also maintains standard
monitor quality and quantity, and regulate practices in the industry through its various
departments and parastatals. The Minister is responsible for coordinating the affairs of
the MPR and issuing the necessary regulations and permits for AG flaring under the
Petroleum Act68 . 
The Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) 
The FME was established in 1988 and was formerly called FEPA69 . The Ministry is
saddled with the responsibility of protecting and improving the quality of water, air,
64 LFN 2004 
65 Ibid s 2-5 
66 The WAGPP sponsors include: Chevron Nigeria Limited (36.7%), NNPC (25%), SPDC (18%), Volta River 
Authority of Ghana (16.3%), Societe Beninoise de Gaz S.A. (2%) and SocieLe Togolaise de Gaz S.A. (2%) and 
2ferated by as the Wesl African Gas Pipeline Company
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), "Mandate", available website: < http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-
11-06-51/execuLive-branch/ I 04-federal-mini try-of-petroleum-resources/184-ministry-of-peLroleum
resources?showalJ=l&ILmitstart=.> accessed on 16/09/2014 
68 The Petroleum Act, s 1 & 3 
69 The Federal Protection Agency Act 1988, s 1, it was later renamed FMENV by the office of the Secretary to the 
Government of Federation through, Presidency circular: Ref No. SGP/6/S.22/1 dated 121h October, 1999 
102
Unimaid Journal of Public Law Vol. 4, July, 2016. 
land forest and wildlife in Nigeria70• Among other things, it prepares, co-ordinate,
pres�ribe and implement standards and regulations . for water �uality, e�fluentlimitation , air quality, atmo pheric and ozone protection, and morutor and enforce
environmental laws and regulation 71. The ministry consists of two Departments that
have an impact on the activities of AG flaring and these are; National Environmental
Standard and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) and the Department of
Environmental Assessment (DEA).
The DEA is charo-ed with implementing the provisions of the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIAr Act,72 which require the developer of major development projects
to conduct an environmental impact assessment before commencing work. While
NESREA73 is empowered to enforce all environmental laws, guidelines, policies,
standards, and regulations (including issues related to GHG emissions) in Nigeria, as
well as enforcing compliance with all international treaties, conventions, protocols and
agreements on the environment to which Nigeria is a party.
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
. . .. This is a department under the MPR an� was e�!ablished to supervise �he activities_ ofoil companies that are granted leases or licenses . It ensures that operations are earned
out in compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. The DPR also en�orces
safety and environmental regulations and advise �overnment an� �elev�nt agencies ontechnical matters and policies that would have an impact on admmistration and control
of the petroleum resources. It also monitors the oil companies' operations_ to ensurethey are in line with national goals and aspirations, including those relatmg to AG
flaring and domestic gas supply obligations.
In effect, petroleum operation as it relates to AG flaring are subject to the above �ets of
regulatory institutions, with no clear precedence of one over the oth�r. !his hasoccasioned a jurisdictional conflict between the main regulators of AG flanng 1.e. FM_E
and the DPR. Even though this conflict has been addressed, the DPR now operates m
conjunction with FME con equent of which FME has played an active role in the
review of the draft Environmental Guidelines for the Petroleum Indust1/5. Moreover,
both agencies currently have equal right to carry o�t inspecti�ns_ of the expl�ration and
production activities where reasonable grounds exist for believmg that envuonmental
70 The Nigeria Ministry of Environment, •gth National Council on Environment Report' Held at the Umar Musa
Yar'adua Indoor Sports Hall. Kaduna on Monday 26t
h to Friday �Olh September 2011 
71 Ibid see also FMENV website:< http://environment.gov.ng/?v1ew=featured.> accessed on the 18/08/2014 
72 Act No. 86 of 1992.
73 NESREA Act published in FRN Official Gazette No. 92, Vol. 94 of July 31, 2007.
74 The Petroleum Act 1969 LFN 1990, Schedule 1 
75 Garba I.M op. Cit (n 21) 
103
Examination of the Frameworks for Combating Gas Flaring in Nigeria_ Why has the Nigerian Government failed 
to combat Gas Flaring 
degra�a�ion !s taking place
76
. Furthermore, both agencies are now the competent 
authonties with regard to managing the BIA procedure. 
Current Status 
The Nigerian Government had been trying to end gas flaring over the years with the 
flare out deadlines been repeatedly po tponed. The most recent deadline had been
Dec�mber 2012
77 .. Acc�rding to Professor Emeka Duruigbo "it wa pathetic and 
hom?le the gas �till bem� flared in Nigeria. The deadline keeps on shifting. Like 
Russia, �?,1
8 
each tillle they_ 1m�os�d standards, fines, deadlines, nothing seems to come 
out of �t . Rece.nt1y, N1gena issued statement permitting oil companie to flare 
substan�ial _ amount o� the gas resources in the country until 2020, which, according to 
the parties mvolved, 1s the feasible year for the flare out deadline 79• 
The Nig�rian government. later in 1999 vigorously pursued the objectives of reducingA� flar�ng �y encour_a�m� ac�elerat_ed gas development and utilisation projectstlu�ugh It p�o- gas ut1hz�t.J.�n fiscal rncentives framework, rather than rely on gas 
flarmg penalties and prescnptive approach80. The MPR has established an accelerated 
gas de�elopment and utili ation_ programme, whereby the Ministry will give the AG to 
any_ thu� party co_mp�ny that 1s ready to invest in gas utili ation and monetisationproject • The �1g�nan Government has directed more efforts at constructing a 
network of ga� p1pelmes across the country in order to deliver flared gas to domestic 
markets and this has led to some reduction in AG f1aring82. 
H?we_ver, de�pite all efforts and rigorous frameworks for combating AG flaring, 
N�gena remams the second_ largest flaring country in the world. Therefore, the paper 
will now addres� the quest10n - why has the Nigerian government, so far, failed to 
com�at A? fl�mg. Why has AG flaring still continued unabated? The following 
headmg will discuss and evaluate factors r,esponsible for the failures of the Nigerian 
government to combat the menace of AG flaring in the country. 
76 The World B�nk Group, _'Reg�lation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A Global Overview and Lessonsfrom the Internat10nal Expenence Report No. 3 World Bank Group 2004 
TTlhld 
' ' 
78 E1;1eka D, •�e "';'orld Bank, .Mul_tinalional Oil Corporations and Resource Course in Africa' (2005) 26 ( l)
�uhl1s�1ed as Umversuy of Pennsylva111a Jo11111al of /111ema1ional Economic Law 1-67 
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Examination of the Key Barriers for Combating Gas Flaring in Nigeria 
The key factors responsible for continuing AG flaring in Nigeria may be deep rooted 
than those listed by the World Bank (see heading 1.2) as it cuts across a wider spectrum 
of various interrelated i sues which this part of the paper will try to analy e83.
Legislative Factor 
The main factor behind the seeming unabated act of flaring in Nigeria could be lack of
efficient and effective legal framework to combat the act. The current legal framework
· is clumsy and generally defective as it contained loopholes that make it easily exploited
by the oil companies. It also occasioned jurisdictional conflicts among the regulatory
agencies as well as conflict of interest between the regulator and the regulated. For
instance, AG flaring has been prohibited in Nigeria since 1979 with over 10 piece of
legislation all confirming the prohibition, however, the oil companies have till now
continued to flare AG in contravention of these laws and without any sanction being
meted against them 84.
To begin with 1979 legislation85, the Act can be argued to have permitted the 
continuation of the AG flaring where it empowers the Minister to issue a certificate
(permit) specifying for the continued AG flaring in a particular field, if the minister is 
satisfied that gas re-injection is not feasible. 86 The Act merely grant minister power to 
issue a permit without strictly setting out criteria for granting such permit neither 
limiting the circumstances for the grant nor prescribing the permissible limit of AG 
volumes to be flares. Moreover, the initial approach taken by the Act to out-rightly 
prohibits AG flaring87 without recognising the lack of required supporting 
infrastructure has been criticised as an approach that wanted to compel gas utilisation 
by threat of a stick88• Similarly, the forfeiture of concession as the likely penalty for AG 
flaring has also been argued as being too rigorous89• However, considering the huge 
economic loss suffered by Nigerian government because of the AG flaring as well as its 
adverse effects on the affected communities, the penalty imposed could be justified. It 
83 The World Bank listed these 4 major factors four; lack of an effective legal and regulatory fra
mework lack of
access to domestic and international gas markets and financing constraints for gas utilisation pro
jects·. See The 
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degra�a�ion !s taking place
76
. Furthermore, both agencies are now the competent 
authonties with regard to managing the BIA procedure. 
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flare out deadlines been repeatedly po tponed. The most recent deadline had been
Dec�mber 2012
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Russia, �?,1
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is therefore, sub�tted that, if not for the problem of infrastructure and funding this Act 
would have effectively curbed AG flaring in Nigeria90.
To corre�t _the anomalies_ occas�o?ed 1979 Act, Regulation was made in 1984
91 limiting
the cond1t10ns for seeking rmmster' s permission to flare AG where it stated that 
p�r�ts should_ o�ly be granted where more than 75% of the AG produced is effective!;utilised or re-m3ected or where the AG contains more than 15% impurities which 
render it unsuitable for industrial purposes92 • However, these clauses were flawed to the 
effect that it exempted eighty six (86) out of one hundred and fifty five (155) fields 
from the prohibit�on while flaring continue on the remaining field without any permit93. 
Therefore, when 1t became obvious to the Nigerian government that, both the 1979 Act 
and the 1984 regulation could not achieve its stated objectives as the AG flaring has 
continued unabated in the country, the government resorted to an economic 
enforcement mechanism by amending the Act in 198594. The new amendment 
introd�ced a penalty of two kobo (N0.02) per 1000 scf of gas flared at any place 
authority _to flare was not granted. The amount of which later increased to N0.50 per 1000 scf m 1990 and to NlO per 1000 scf in 1998 and lastly increased to $3.50 USD 
per 1000 scf in 2008. 
However, the fines introduced were also insufficient when compared to the amount 
Nigeria looses in flaring annually. it has been rightly observed by the World Bank that: 
"It is worthwhile noting that in recent years oil companies in Nigeria have been 
charged a total of between 20 million and 50 million Naira (or US$150,000-370,000) 
annually for flaring associated gas. However, this has to be seen in the overall context 
of ga� flare�. A recent study carried out for the Bureau of Public Enterprises of 
Nigeria, esttmated that each year the country loses between US$500 million and 
US!2.5 billion �o gas flarin( 
95
. It was also observed that, the cost of the gas utili ation 
proJect at the tm�e �e -�ct mtr�duce� amounted to $56 million that is incomparably more than the ms1gmf1cant fmes imposed for AG flaring96 • Therefore it was 
economically beneficial and comparatively cheaper for oil companies to con�inue gas 
90
• 
Pa�l S.T,. 'Lega! Response to Gas Flaring in Developed and Developing Countries: A ComparaLive Analysis ofNigena,_ Umted Kingdom and Norway' (Working Research Paper Series No. 2010/14) fntemational Energy I.Aw
and Policy Research Paper Series 
91 The Associated Gas Re-injection Regulation op. Cit (n 23)92 lbid s 5
93 Yinka 0, (n 56) 58 
94 The A ociated Gas Re-injection Amendment Act 1985 op. Cit (n 31) 
95 The_ World Bank's Global Gas Flaring Reduction public-private partnership ('GGFR'), 'Regulation of
Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A Global Overview and Lessons from International Experience' Report 
No. 3 of April 2004, 64 
96 Sarah A.K 'Nigeria: 111e Political Economy Of Oil' (Oxford University Press, 1994) 162
106 
Unimaid Journal of Public I.Aw Vol. 4, July, 2016. 
flaring by paying the meager penalty than to implement a gas utilisation programme as 
envi aged by the Act97• 
Institutional Factor 
While evaluating the institutional regulation as one of the key barriers for combating 
AG flaring in Nigeria, it would revealed issue of overlapping and conflicting 
jurisdiction among the agencies charged with the responsibility of regulating the 
practice of flaring. The DPR and the FME as the main regulatory agencies are both 
charged with monitoring and enforcement of environmental standards and EIA 
procedures in the exploration operations in the Nigerian petroleum industry and they 
have both enacted distinct Regulations on the same sector98 . Although this issue has 
been addressed recently, however, there is no doubt the duplicity in functions and the 
multiplicity in the Guidelines and Standards impedes the effective and smooth 
monitoring of AG flaring in the country. 
Moreover, there also issue of conflict of interest by the regulator this is because, NNPC 
as one of the primar� regulator in monitoring and enforcement through the DPR - its 
inspectorate division 9 is also a partner in most of the Joint Venture agreements with 
the oil companies. Its regulatory functions were criticised, as being a double 
standard100 . It was argued that 'the fundamental challenge of this body is the conflict 
between its commercial and regulatory functions' 101.
Therefore, the dual status of partner-regulator played by the NNPC creates a conflict of 
interest and this has led to failures in strict enforcement of the AG flaring regulations 
against the oil companies. It would have also unfavourably affected the interest of the 
NNPC - a government subsidiary with the majority shares in the joint ventures. This 
could be the reason for failure of the oil companies to ensure maximum compliance 
with the standards and guidelines102 . It was also argued that, DPR experiences 
insufficient funding and a lack of enabling powers to initiate and implement regulatory 
measures103. Hence, it is submitted that, nothing good would come out of the 
enforcement of AG flaring regulation as long as the MPR through NNPC continues its 
dual roles. 
97 Baurzhan K, 'Anti-Gas Flaring Regulations and the Law: The History and Recent Developments in Kazakhstan 
and Nigeria' (2012) 10 (5) Oil, Gas and Energy I.Aw Journal
98 The DPR Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry 1991 and the EIA Guidelines for 
Exploration and Production Projects 1994 under the Federal Ministry of Environment 
99 The Petroleum Act 1969, Schedule 1, paragraph 24-27 
100 Ibironke T.O, 'Transferring Alberta's Gas Flaring Reduction Regulatory Framework to Nigeria: Potentials and 
Limitations' (2007) 44 (4) Alberta Law Review
101 Paul S.T op. Cit (n 90) 
102 Ojukwu-Ogba N, 'Legal and Regulatory Instrument on Environmental Pollution in Nigeria: Much Talk, Less 
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Economic Factor 
As stated earlier, oil and gas is the main stronghold of the Nigeria's economy, it 
accounts for the largest source of the government's revenue and export earnings. In 
2012, it was accounted fo�i46% of export revenu�, a more than USD $100 billion of
revenue to t?e government . Therefore, an effective enforcement of any regulation to 
end gas flarmg may produce huge, unpredictable economic and political consequences 
for the government. The task would have been easier if Nigerian had a diversified 
ec_onomy and the government was not dependent completely on oil revenues
105
. Hence,
this suggests that, to a large extent the reduction of flaring in Nigeria may not be 
determined by laws and regulations alone, rather fiscal policies and regime that favour 
investments in AG utilisation projects. It appears that the Nigerian government has 
already taken steps in this regard with the current administration of President 
Muhammadu Buhari's determination to diversify the economy while safeguarding the 
Niger-Delta environment. 
Political Factor 
It is also crucial to analyse the Nigerian government's outward lack of political will to 
enforce anti-flaring regulations and laws. What appears as a lack of political will here is 
the failure of the Nigerian government to exercise its authority and supports any 
measure that would curb AG flaring in the country. However, it was suggested that, this 
c?uld be fo� fear of what its exercise of authority may occasion the economy when the 
011 c�mpan1es shut down operations. For instance, in a judgement of the case brought 
by Niger Delta communities against the Shell Company and NNPct06, when the court
decl�ed the AG flaring in the Niger Delta violated the rights to life, health and dignity 
and 1s��ed a court order to refrain from gas-flaring. Thus, instead of the Nigerian 
author�tles to _make sure that Shell abides by the judgment, rather it joint Shell inappealmg the Judgement and the appeal Court granted a conditional stay of execution 
and Order, which permitted the defendants to continue gas flaring. Furthermore, in 
September 2006 also, the Port Harcourt High Court dismissed a separate lawsuit 
bro_ug?t against Shell, _Total, Agip, Chevron and NNPC regarding ga flaring - theplamtiffs appealed the Judgement and the matter is still pending 107• Thu , this stressed 
the need for a legal framework and strong political will to stop the massive flaring of 
natural gas in the country. 
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Conclusion 
Associated Gas flaring is a hazard that has brought multiple effects to Nigeria as an
important country in the African region. Whatsoever the motives behind the flaring
might be, the fact remains that, it is wastage of valuable resources much needed for
economic development that can be utilise electricity, particularly in Nigeria where more
than 50% of its populace have no access to electricity. The flaring of AG also emits
CO2, methane and other forms of gases, thus, contribute to global warming causing
climate change, and this negates Nigeria's commitments under the various international
treaties dealing with environment. Therefore, combating AG flaring in Nigeria requires
not only the effective and efficient legal framework prohibiting AG flaring or the
imposition of. fines, but also the provision of attractive fiscal incentives that will
encourage oil companies to develop gas re-injection and utilisation facilities, coupled
with the authorities' strong political will to end the practice. Therefore, this paper
seeks to give recommendations to the Nigerian policy makers that would aid them in
designing a framework that will effectively and efficiently eliminate or atleast reduce
the volume of gas flared in the country: 
1. A predictable, effective and transparent legal and fiscal framework is necessary
for the oil companies to operate optimally and the framework should meet the
incentives compatibility standard that would motivate investment in AG flaring
projects, meet the Nigeria's environmental and economic objectives while
achieving profit maximisation goals for the investors. Additionally, the conditions
under which operators can flare AG without prior approval from the relevant
regulatory Agency be clearly defined in the framework.
2. The institutions charged with the responsibility of combating AG flaring (DPR,
FME or the new ones that would be created under the PIB) should be
independently and sufficiently financed to give them strong and courage to
enforce the laws. It is important to have an authority independent of oil and gas
industry that can effectively regulate AG flaring provisions regardless of the
state's equity in a particular oil company.
3. The Nigerian government should develop competitive downstream markets,
transparent and efficient regulatory and legal frameworks that provide access to
network and customers. The oil companies should also be given unqualified
permission under the contractual arrangements to market the AG in the
downstream gas market as this will improve the development of investment in
AG and create suitable opportunities for operators to utilise the AG.
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Conclusion 
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climate change, and this negates Nigeria's commitments under the various international
treaties dealing with environment. Therefore, combating AG flaring in Nigeria requires
not only the effective and efficient legal framework prohibiting AG flaring or the
imposition of. fines, but also the provision of attractive fiscal incentives that will
encourage oil companies to develop gas re-injection and utilisation facilities, coupled
with the authorities' strong political will to end the practice. Therefore, this paper
seeks to give recommendations to the Nigerian policy makers that would aid them in
designing a framework that will effectively and efficiently eliminate or atleast reduce
the volume of gas flared in the country: 
1. A predictable, effective and transparent legal and fiscal framework is necessary
for the oil companies to operate optimally and the framework should meet the
incentives compatibility standard that would motivate investment in AG flaring
projects, meet the Nigeria's environmental and economic objectives while
achieving profit maximisation goals for the investors. Additionally, the conditions
under which operators can flare AG without prior approval from the relevant
regulatory Agency be clearly defined in the framework.
2. The institutions charged with the responsibility of combating AG flaring (DPR,
FME or the new ones that would be created under the PIB) should be
independently and sufficiently financed to give them strong and courage to
enforce the laws. It is important to have an authority independent of oil and gas
industry that can effectively regulate AG flaring provisions regardless of the
state's equity in a particular oil company.
3. The Nigerian government should develop competitive downstream markets,
transparent and efficient regulatory and legal frameworks that provide access to
network and customers. The oil companies should also be given unqualified
permission under the contractual arrangements to market the AG in the
downstream gas market as this will improve the development of investment in
AG and create suitable opportunities for operators to utilise the AG.
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